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POTENTIAL LITIGATION AGAINST 
AUDITORS FOR NEGLIGENCE 
Thomas C. Pearson 
This Article addresses potential litigation against auditors for 
negligence, an especially important topic because such litigation is likely to 
increase in future years. Several reasons exist for more litigation on 
negligence. First, in the 2010 Supreme Court case reviewing the status of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), both sides 
accepted the PCAOB as a government regulatory agency, at least for some 
purposes. This implies that the auditing standards as approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should have some legal status. 
Second, three major reforms of relevant professional standards are 
occurring. Because the new standards leave more room for judgment, they 
are likely to increase litigation against auditors. Third, the auditing 
industry’s fundamental duties of care to avoid negligence are extensive and 
illustrated primarily by inspection reports and enforcement cases presented 
by the PCAOB. Fourth, recent attempts to limit auditors’ liability have 
failed. Thus, real steps by the auditing profession are needed primarily to 
raise the quality within the profession to help limit potential future litigation 
against auditors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Auditing plays an essential role for society’s capital markets.1 The 
auditing profession is expected “to bring integrity, independence, 
objectivity, and professional competence to the financial reporting 
process.”2 The auditor is not an insurer of the financial statements, but does 
provide reasonable assurances to management’s representations in financial 
statements.3 Auditing of public companies4 has become increasingly 
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 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has even summarized the important role of auditing. See United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810−11, 817−18 (1984). 
 2. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-163, AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: 
CONTINUED CONCENTRATION IN AUDIT MARKET FOR LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES DOES NOT 
CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION 7 (2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08163.pdf. 
 3. It is important to remember that “[a]uditors do not make the business decisions or create 
the external events that cause a company’s failure.” Rod Phelan & Gavin R. Villareal, Issues in 
Accountant Liability Litigation Arising from Business Failures (Tex. Trial Lawyers Ass’n 
Commercial Litig. Seminar, Discussion Draft, 2006), available at 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications/?page=81 (follow “Issues in Accountant 
Liability Litigation Arising from Business Failures” hyperlink). 
 4. An audit of a public company is “an examination of the financial statements of any issuer 
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intertwined with the law5 in the decade following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX).6 Dramatic developments in the profession,7 Congress, 
regulatory agencies, and the courts, have affected the environment for 
auditing and litigation against auditors. 
SOX was landmark legislation which expanded upon the duty for 
internal controls for public companies.8 SOX also added penalties for 
financial crimes,9 including interference with an audit or government 
investigation.10 It substantially improved corporate governance and the 
“tone at the top” of public companies.11 SOX has also produced some 
improvements in internal controls, financial reporting and disclosure, and 
the performance of auditors, and has enhanced government enforcement.12 
The PCAOB, created by SOX.13 replaced self-regulation of the audit 
profession,14 and led to stronger oversight of financial reporting.15 The 
United States government encouraged other countries to establish similar 
quasi-governmental oversight over auditors, independent from the 
                                                                                                                                          
by an independent public accounting firm in accordance with the [PCAOB] rules . . . for the 
purpose of expressing an opinion on such statements.” See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a)(2), 
15 U.S.C. § 7201(2) (2006). 
 5. In leading capital market countries, more auditing authorities have become law in order to 
increase accountability of public companies, their auditors, and the standard setters in auditing and 
accounting. See generally Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of 
Accounting and Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 65 (2005). 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 7. Audit methods have evolved during the past couple decades, such as increased “risk based 
auditing.” 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
 9. Penalties for financial crimes added by SOX include financial fraud, white collar crime, 
and improper certification of financial statements by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1501 (2006). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). 
 11. For example, an enhanced audit committee role has occurred as a result of SOX. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1 (2006). 
 12. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-419SP, GAO FORUM ON GOVERNANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHALLENGES TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN U.S. CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03419sp.pdf (identifying “challenges facing regulators, the 
accounting profession, and boards of directors and management of public companies in effectively 
implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related regulatory actions to improve public 
confidence in U.S. corporate governance and accountability systems”). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). 
 14. See Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7. J. BUS. & 
SEC. L. 1, 4, 5 (2007). See generally James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial 
Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 
304 (2003). 
 15. See Goelzer, supra note 14, at 1, 2, 4 (discussing how the unreliability of financial 
information was painfully evident after uncovering massive amounts of fraudulent financial 
statements of major companies in the early 2000s). 
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profession. Such changes in overseeing the auditing profession have made it 
possible for more global interaction of regulatory authorities.16 
Inspections of financial audits are among the powers delegated to the 
PCAOB.17 The quality of such inspection reports has been the PCAOB’s 
real success to date.18 These reports have revealed that many deficient 
audits exist, with a substantial number of audits having failed at least once 
to apply a basic generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) or by 
implication, generally accepted auditing standard (GAAS).19 The preface of 
each PCAOB inspection report shows that the PCAOB believes its reports 
are merely produced for remedial educational purposes, not for any legal 
uses.20 
In 2010, in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,21 the Supreme Court 
accepted the PCAOB’s legal status as a governmental agency.22 Although 
                                                                                                                                          
 16. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 53 (2009), 
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF 
[hereinafter PWC 2008 STUDY] (“[R]egulators around the [world have] becom[e] more active and 
[are] increasing cooperation [with the SEC].”). In 2008, the SEC assisted with over 590 requests 
from foreign regulators as a result of “several bilateral and multilateral arrangements that the SEC 
has entered into in recent years.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5 (2008), www.sec.gov/about/ 
secpar/secpar2008.pdf. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 7214 (2006). Other PCAOB powers include regulating the industry through 
registration of audit firms of public companies, standard setting, and enforcement actions against 
registered accounting firms performing audits of public companies. See id. §§ 7212, 7215, 7218. 
 18. See generally Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits 
in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 84–85 (2007) (discussing the effects of the 
PCAOB inspections and reports). Compared to prior peer reviews conducted within the industry, 
“PCAOB’s inspections are more rigorous, more technical, and more intense.” See id. at 81. 
 19. See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., REL. NO. 2007-010, REPORT ON THE 
PCAOB’S 2004, 2005 AND 2006 INSPECTIONS OF DOMESTIC TRIENNIALLY INSPECTED FIRMS 
(2007), http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/2007_10-22_4010_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
REPORT ON PCAOB]. 
 20. See, e.g., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., REL. NO. 104-2005-082, INSPECTION 
OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, LLP (2005), http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/ 
2005_Beckstead_and_Watts.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS]. 
“[R]eferences [to violation of laws, rules, or professional standards] are not a result of an 
adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute conclusive findings of fact or of violations 
for purposes of imposing legal liability.” Id. 
 21. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). A 
constitutional challenge to the PCAOB’s legal status was started after a small boutique audit firm 
received a critical inspection report from the PCAOB. Id. at 3149. A non-profit public interest 
organization, Free Enterprise Fund, joined the audit firm as plaintiffs in the litigation. Id. The 
Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that there was no constitutional problem. Id. The Supreme 
Court held in a 5-4 decision that the only unconstitutional aspect was the double removal clause, 
an easily fixable problem. Id. at 3146, 3151, 3161, 3164. For the accounting perspective on the 
case, see Ronald R. King, The PCAOB Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court to Decide on 
the PCAOB’s Conformity with the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Appointments Clause, 24 
ACCT. HORIZONS 79 (2010). For details of the investigation that launched the case, see 
INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, supra note 20, at 3 (finding that in half of the audits 
inspected, the audit firm did not obtain “sufficient competent” evidence to support its audit 
opinion). 
 22. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64. 
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the case’s real significance is its effect on administrative law,23 indirectly, 
the case reveals how the auditing profession’s audits of public companies 
are legally regulated. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit was based on the reasoning that the PCAOB is subject to 
pervasive SEC control.24 The SEC’s control over the PCAOB includes the 
SEC’s power to approve the PCAOB’s budget.25 Also, while the PCAOB 
can propose rules, the SEC decides whether to adopt them.26 
Part I of this Article discusses major developments in professional 
standard reforms that impact litigation against auditors for negligence. 
These new standards include the adjustment to new U.S. GAAP, the 
movement toward international accounting standards, and a likely subset of 
accounting standards for private companies. These accounting changes also 
enable more second guessing by litigators as to whether an accountant and 
an auditor have properly applied the appropriate accounting standards. 
Part II analyzes potential negligence by auditors. Specifically, duties of 
care that auditors owe are revealed through breaking down the professional 
standards into fundamental material duties. Breaches of these duties are 
often illustrated in the PCAOB’s releases for inspection reports of firms and 
enforcement actions. 
Part III examines the audit industry’s failed recent pursuit of legal 
liability limitations. The failure of the auditing industry to gather any 
significant support for liability limitations is an additional development 
suggesting how the public views litigation as one means to accountability. 
Part IV proposes reforms both in the law and the auditing profession in 
response to the real need of the auditing profession to raise the audit quality 
to prevent potential litigation. The public expects high audit quality and the 
                                                                                                                                          
 23. See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the 
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1 (2010). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Why Professors Bruff 
and Pildes Are Wrong About the PCAOB Case, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 133 (2009); Michael 
A. Carvin, Noel J. Francisco, & Christian G. Vergonis, Massive, Unchecked Power by Design: 
The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 199 (2007); Michael R. Keefe, The Constitutionality of 
the Double For-Cause Removal Restriction: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1653 (2009); Gary Lawson, 
The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73 
(2009); Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An 
Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361 (2010); Donna M. 
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005); Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back Into Separation of 
Powers Analysis: Why the SEC-PCAOB Structure is Constitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
85 (2009). 
 24. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149. The SEC plays an essential role in the auditing 
environment, due to its role in letting the private sector set accounting standards for public 
companies. Also, the SEC can establish accounting practices for public companies, such as 
Application of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2010). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (2006). 
 26. Id. § 7217(b)(2). 
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profession needs to take more self-help steps to minimize likely litigation 
against the industry in the future. Conclusions are presented at the end. 
I. REFORMS OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ASSIST 
LITIGATORS’ ATTACKS 
Standards in accounting and auditing exist to encourage corporate 
management and their accountants to exercise due professional care in the 
performance of their duties.27 Due care imposes a professional 
responsibility on the auditors to follow generally accepted auditing 
standards and apply generally accepted accounting principles in auditing the 
financial statements of a client entity.28 
A serious problem for the auditing profession was that the increased 
complexity of accounting standards had overwhelmed the capacity of most 
accounting and auditing professionals.29 Furthermore, a confusing set of 
multiple sources existed for GAAP. In 2009, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) sought to help by creating the Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC), a single source for U.S. GAAP.30 
In the process of creating the ASC, U.S. GAAP is now shorter, more 
principled, and easier to research than old U.S. GAAP. Litigation over 
application of professional standards should once again generate a demand 
for more detailed accounting and auditing rules. Since finding appropriate 
authority is much easier work than previously, these changes make it more 
likely that litigators can and will conduct accounting and auditing research. 
They can find the appropriate accounting authority that should have applied 
to the financial statements under scrutiny in the litigated case. One area of 
the ASC of particular concern is the likely increase in disclosure for certain 
loss contingencies.31 The fear is that increased disclosure will likely lead to 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 27. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 113, §§ 150.02, 230.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). 
 28. Enforcement of professional standards relies primarily on the responsible individual or 
organization, secondarily upon the accounting professionals, thirdly on auditors, fourthly on 
investigation by the overseeing government agency, and lastly by litigation in the courts. 
 29. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., NOTICE TO CONSTITUENTS (V 4.1) ABOUT THE 
CODIFICATION 5 (2010). 
 30. Id. The SEC is authorized to determine the accounting principles for the financial reporting 
by public companies, such as application of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2010). 
However, the SEC usually defers to the FASB to create accounting standards. See Commission 
Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard 
Setter, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,335 (May 1, 2003). 
 31. “In July 2010, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft, Contingencies ([ASC] 450): Disclosure 
of Certain Loss Contingencies.” Randall D. McClanahan, Law and Accounting Committee 
Summary of Current FASB Developments, JOHNSTON BARTON ATTORNEYS (2010 ABA Annual 
Meeting, San Francisco, CA), Aug. 7, 2010, at 1; FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FINAL 
ACCOUNTING SERIES, CONTINGENCIES (TOPIC 450): DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN LOSS 
CONTINGENCIES (2010). The proposed changes increase the required disclosures. See 
McClanahan, supra. For a discussion of loss contingencies, see Kenneth E. Harrison & Thomas C. 
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more litigation.32 
International financial reporting standards (IFRS) are the product of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).33 In 2007, the IASB was 
recognized by the SEC as an official standard setter in accounting.34 The 
initial roadmap for convergence of accounting standards has evolved into a 
comprehensive IFRS “work plan” to permit U.S. public companies to use 
IFRS.35 It is possible that U.S. public companies will start using IFRS in 
2015.36 Initially, the change from U.S. GAAP to IFRS creates an increased 
chance of litigation because of the “greater risk of misunderstanding and of 
improper application of” the standards, given unfamiliar rules.37 Adoption 
of the IFRS will also create an expanded litigation risk for auditors and 
accountants because of fewer rules and more decisions based on the 
auditor’s judgment.38 Professional judgment requires reasoning based on a 
                                                                                                                                          
Pearson, Communications Between Auditors and Attorneys for the Identification and Evaluation 
of Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, 3 ACCT. HORIZONS 76 (1989). 
 32. See Letter from Thomas W. White (Chairman of the ABA’s Law and Accounting 
Committee), et al., to International Accounting Standards Board, on Measurement of Liabilities in 
IAS 37: Proposed Amendment to IAS 37 (May 19, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/ 
buslaw/blt/content/2010/11/0005.pdf. 
In-house attorneys particularly may face pressures to disclose sensitive legal advice. In 
their financial statements, reporting entities will need to disclose, with respect to 
recognized liabilities that are subject to estimation uncertainty, the expected timing of 
payments and an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of such 
payments. 
Id. at 3. 
 33. About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS FOUND., 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). 
International accounting standards are included within the IFRS. Id. 
 34. Thus, foreign companies may now file their financial statements with the SEC using 
IASB’s IFRS without reconciling to U.S. GAAP. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of 
Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 249). 
 35. See Matthew E. Kaplan & Steven J. Slutzky, Goodbye Roadmap, Hello Work Plan: SEC 
Continues to Consider Use of IFRS by U.S. Issuers, ACCT. POL’Y & PRAC. REP. (BNA), May 14, 
2010, available at 2010 WL 1917096. 
 36. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE 
CONSIDERATION IF INCORPORATING FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS 2 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/global 
accountingstandards/globalaccountingstandards.pdf. See also Commission Statement in Support 
of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 9,494, 9,495 (Mar. 2, 2010). 
 37. Jay Epstein & Susan Cheng, Broader Acceptance of IFRS in U.S. Capital Markets: 
Implication for Attorneys, 14(1) SEC. LAW (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div., London, U.K.), 
Apr. 2008, at 21, 22, available at http://www.int-bar.org/images/downloads/Newsletters/Securities 
LawApril2008.pdf. See generally William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment 
Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989 (2009); 
Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692 (2008); Neal F. 
Newman, The U.S. Moves to International Accounting Standards—A Matter of Cultural 
Discord—How Do We Reconcile?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 835 (2009). 
 38. See Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 37; Karmel, supra note 37; Newman, supra note 
37. See also Epstein & Cheng, supra note 37. 
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documented analysis of the issues.39 Furthermore, since “IFRS includes a 
much greater degree of qualitative analysis than U.S. GAAP,”40 expanded 
litigation risk exists under IFRS. 
Private sector accounting is also likely to change. In 2009, for mid-
sized and smaller companies the IASB has created even fewer accounting 
rules to simplify the accounting knowledge needed to prepare the financial 
statements.41 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), together with the oversight body for FASB, created a Blue 
Ribbon Panel to study this development for application to the U.S. private 
sector.42 More second guessing by lawyers and judges is likely to occur 
when fewer rule-oriented accounting standards exist. 
II. PROFESSIONAL DUTIES AFFECTING LITIGATION FOR 
NEGLIGENCE 
Negligence against an auditor is based on state law.43 Negligence 
generally requires the plaintiff prove a duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach 
of that duty, causation (both factual and proximate), and damages.44 To 
whom a duty is owed (whether a duty is owed to third parties) has received 
extensive attention.45 
                                                                                                                                          
 39. If detailed analysis exists, some believe that “[n]egligence is even more difficult to prove 
when the accountant’s subjective judgment is in issue.” Accounting, Practice & Responsibility 
Portfolio 5500: Preparing for and Defending Accounting Liability Litigation, TAX MGMT. 
PORTFOLIOS (BNA), 2006, § V.B.2, available at 2006 WL 2624270 [hereinafter Accounting, 
Practice & Responsibility Portfolio]. 
 40. See Vincent J. Love & John H. Eickemeyer, IFRS and Accountants’ Liability, CPA J., Apr. 
2009, at 54. 
 41. INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., A GUIDE TO THE IFRS FOR SMES (2010), 
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/4308000F-FAC8-41F3-BC15-E594E8058EB6/0/GuideToIFRS 
forSMEs2010Oct.pdf. See also IFRS for SMEs Fact Sheet, INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. 
(July 9, 2009), http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/FBAE7BA8-8B32-43F8-AE3C-D4DA92D046 
C6/0/IFRSforSMEsfactsheet2.pdf. 
 42. Panel to Address Accounting Standards for Private Companies, J. OF ACCT., Dec. 17, 
2009, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/20092429.htm. The eighteen member Blue 
Ribbon Panel has a mixture of financial statement “users, creditors, lenders, owners of businesses, 
and preparers.” Denise Lugo, Private Company Reporting: Blue Ribbon Panel to Weigh 
Launching Standard Setter for U.S. Private Companies, ACCT. POL’Y & PRAC. REP. (BNA), Apr. 
16, 2010, available at 2010 WL 1510529. 
 43. Minor variations exist among states in the explanation “of the elements of professional 
negligence.” See Accounting, Practice & Responsibility Portfolio, supra note 39, at V.B. n. 89. 
 44. DAN L. GOLDWASSER & THOMAS ARNOLD, ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY §§ 4-1–4-2 (PLI 
Corp. & Sec. L. Libr. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965). 
 45. See generally John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party 
Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L. REV. 149 (1987); 
Willis W. Hagen II, Accountants’ Common Law Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 181; Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of 
Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor 
Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171 (2000); Jodi B. 
Scherl, Note, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Parties: Balancing the 
Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1994). 
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At issue is the nature of the duty when the accountant does not fully 
comply with applicable professional standards. The nature of the legal duty 
of care owed has rarely received much analysis. An auditor has the duty to 
use the skill and knowledge possessed by an accountant in good standing.46 
“Expert testimony is usually necessary to establish the standard of care 
required of an accountant since the matter is ‘beyond the realm of ordinary 
lay knowledge.’”47 Proof of the duty normally occurs through work-papers, 
audit manuals, records, and expert testimony.48 The plaintiff’s expert 
generally identifies the duty of care and points out any material departure 
from that duty. 
“Professional standards are commonly looked to as evidence of the 
appropriate standard of care in a negligence case . . . .”49 The failure of 
applying any fundamental auditing duty in a material way should lead a 
jury to conclude that it was a material departure and negligent breached of 
duty.50 The question for the jury for negligence too often is when this part 
of the auditor’s material conduct falls outside professional standards. The 
jury needs further guidance as proposed in the forthcoming tables. 
Ten fundamental audit standards provide a framework for the 
responsibilities of auditors based on generally accepted auditing standards.51 
                                                                                                                                          
 46. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) (requiring that “one who 
undertakes to render service in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill 
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in 
similar communities”). 
 47. GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 44, § 4-2, at 4-36 (quoting Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 
261 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C. 1979)). 
 48. See Leo R. Beus, Workpapers, Audit Materials, Personnel Records and Expense Account 
Information Can Often Provide Helpful Information in an Audit Malpractice Case, SN073 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 139 (2008). 
 49. GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 44, § 4-2, at 4-39. 
 50. Some courts require articulation of relevant duties of care under GAAS and how they were 
breached at the pleading stages. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 712 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 51. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 113 § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). These ten standards 
are: 
General Standards 
1. The auditor must have adequate technical training and proficiency to 
perform the audit. 
2. The auditor must maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters 
relating to the audit. 
3. The auditor must exercise due professional care in the performance of the 
audit and the preparation of the report. 
Standards of Field Work 
1. The auditor must adequately plan the work and must properly supervise 
any assistants. 
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The Statements of Auditing Standards (SASs) expand upon the GAAS 
framework.52 The PCAOB adopted the 2003 version of the Codification of 
the Statements on Auditing Standards (AU) as interim audit standards.53 
The duties from all these standards are not yet, arguably, law in the audit of 
public companies because the standards are not effective until approved by 
both the PCAOB and SEC. 
The PCAOB’s inspection reports separate negligent audit failures from 
any legal implications. “[The PCAOB inspection report] reviews . . .  
certain aspects of selected audits performed by the firm and reviews . . . 
other matters related to the firm’s quality control system.”54 Deficiencies in 
auditing or accounting are raised in the PCAOB’s inspection reports.55 
Insights into the variable quality of the audits of public companies are 
provided in these inspection reports.56 
Enforcement actions by the PCAOB occur if either: (A) “intentional or 
knowing conduct . . . violat[es] . . . applicable statutory, regulatory, or 
professional standard[s];” or (B) there are “repeated instances of negligent 
conduct.”57 Thus, the PCAOB has lower standards of enforcement than 
should exist in negligence lawsuits in the courts. 
Tables 1 to 3 provide examples of auditors’ duties and cases where an 
entity has breached the auditing standard duty of care.58 Simplified 
                                                                                                                                          
2. The auditor must obtain a sufficient understanding of the entity and its 
environment, including its internal control . . . . 
3. The auditor must obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence by 
performing audit procedures to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion 
regarding the financial statements under audit. 
Standards of Reporting 
1. The auditor must state in the auditor’s report whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance with [GAAP]. 
2. The auditor must identify in the auditor’s report those circumstances in 
which [GAAP] principles have not been consistently observed . . . .  
3. When the auditor determines that informative disclosures are not 
reasonably adequate, the auditor must so state in the auditor’s report. 
4. The auditor must either express an opinion regarding the financial 
statements . . . or state that an opinion cannot be expressed, in the auditor’s 
report. 
Id. 
 52. SASs were created and codified by the AICPA. 
 53. PCAOB History, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., 
http://pcaobus.org/About/History/Pages/History.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). 
 54. INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, supra note 20, at 2. 
 55. Id. at 2–3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(5) (2006). 
 58. While some of the sources provided in the tables give the precise section in the AU, other 
sources lack the reference but are discernable by their description of the audit problem. 
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standards in the tables are presented for purposes of explaining them to a 
jury of non-accountants. Other standards exist, but they have rarely led 
regulators to cite them for violation. These examples are presented 
primarily through PCAOB inspection reports and enforcement actions. U.S. 
standards are shaped by U.S. legal jurisprudence and SEC requirements.59 
International standards on auditing (ISA) generally evidence the same 
fundamental duty.60 
Table 1: Selected Field Work Duties Under 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
                                                                                                                                          
Comparable international standards on auditing (ISA) provisions are provided because more than 
100 countries are either using ISAs or have declared their intent to use them. International 
Standards on Auditing, ESTANDARDSFORUM, http://estandardsforum.org/about_standards/ 
international-standards-on-auditing (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 59. Because of the different legal environment in the United States, U.S. “standards are often 
more directive and procedures oriented” than ISA. James M. Sylph, Technical Director, Int’l 
Auditing & Assurance Standards Bd., Speech at American Accounting Association Auditing 
Section 2005 Mid Year Conference: Global Convergence—Near or Far? (Jan. 14, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://press.ifac.org/speech/2005/01/global-convergence-near-or-far). 
 60. See INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL QUALITY CONTROL, 
AUDITING, REVIEW, OTHER ASSURANCE, AND RELATED SERVICES PRONOUNCEMENTS (2010), 
http://web.ifac.org/publication. 
AU § ISA 
comparable 
Example of Auditors’ Duties 
Under GAAS Which if Breached 
Creates Negligence 
Example(s) of a Breach 
of Duty 
 
312 320 Duty to determine the appropriate 
audit risk and materiality levels of 
important items that may impact the 
financial statements 
AAER 2779, 13 
313 500 Duty to use substantive tests on the 
financial statement assertions, prior 
to the balance sheet date 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2010-025, 4 
316 240 Duty to evaluate the risk of fraud 
in the financial statements 
AAER 3099, 3  
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2007-087, 5 
316 240 Duty to evaluate transactions 
which appear fraudulent 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-120, 9 
316 240 Duty to consider whether a change 
in auditing procedures is needed to 
obtain more reliable evidence 
because of a higher risk of fraud 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-002, 7 
317 250 Duty to design the audit to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting 
material misstatement arising from 
illegal acts that could have a direct 
and material impact on the financial 
statements 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-009, 12 
319  Duty to consider internal control 
for purposes of the financial 
statements 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2008-249, 4 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-203, 6 
324 402 Duty to consider the effect of PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
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service organizations, such as 
payroll handlers, on the entity’s 
internal control 
2006-003, 3 
326 530 Duty to review samples of the 
underlying accounting data and 
corroborating information 
 
 
328 545 Duty to test management’s fair 
value measurements and disclosures 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-069, 6 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2008-231, 4 
150 
329 
500 Duty to obtain sufficient 
competent evidential matter 
obtained through inspection, 
observation, inquiries, and 
confirmation so as to create a 
reasonable basis for an audit 
opinion 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-069, 6  
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-138, 7 
330 Cf. 580 Duty to obtain and evaluate 
confirmations and other evidence 
collected from third parties about 
management’s financial statement 
assertions 
AAER 3146, 4 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-138, 7 
330 505 Duty to maintain control over the 
confirmation requests and 
responses 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-002, 12 
331 501 Duty to test appropriately for the 
existence, completeness, and 
valuation of inventory 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-157, 4 
333 580 Duty to investigate if audit evidence 
contradicts a representation made 
by management 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2010-003, 11 
334 550 Duty to seek to identify related 
party relationships and transactions 
AAER 3116A, 6 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2008-219, 4 
336 620 Duty to evaluate any relationships 
and findings from a specialist, such 
as a valuation expert 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2010-077, 4 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-079, 4 
337 501 Duty to obtain appropriate and 
timely responses from the entity’s 
attorneys considering litigation, 
claims, and assessments
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-157, 4 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-149, 4 
341 570 Duty to determine if substantial 
doubt exists about an entity’s ability 
to continue as a going concern for 
the next year 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2010-081, 4 
342 540 Duty to evaluate the reasonableness 
of significant accounting estimates 
made by management, including the 
methodology and assumptions used 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-203, 10 
342 540 Duty to consider the historical 
experience of the entity in making 
past estimates to assess the 
reliability of the process in making 
current estimates 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-006, 8 
 
350 530 Duty to make a sample size 
sufficiently large to obtain 
reasonable assurance to detect 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-202, 9 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
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Table 2: Selected Other Duties Under 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
misstatements 2006-205, 4 
350 530 Duty for a sample to represent the 
population from which the sample 
was selected and project 
misstatements from the sample to 
the population 
SEC Administrative 
Proceeding  
 No. 3-12208 
380 260 Duty to inform the board of 
directors’ audit committee about 
any material disagreements with 
management 
 
390  Duty to assess important audit 
deficiencies identified after the date 
of the audit report 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2006-001, 3 
AU § ISA 
comparable 
Example of Auditors’ Duties 
Under GAAS Which if Breached 
Creates Negligence 
Example(s) of a Breach 
of Duty 
 
150 200 Duty to have sufficient knowledge 
of the relevant audit standards 
AAER 3027, 5 
210 220 Duty to have adequate technical 
training and proficiency as an 
auditor 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2010-102, 3 
220 200 Duty to ensure that the auditors are 
free of personal impairments to 
independence
AAER 3122, 2 
 
230 200 Duty to exercise due professional 
care and professional skepticism 
in the performance of the audit 
AAER 3146, 4 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2006-181A, 6 
230 220 Duty to supervise properly those 
involved in the audit, based on their 
level of knowledge, skill, and ability 
to evaluate the audit evidence 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-005, 5 
410 230 Duty to report whether the financial 
statements are in 
accordance with GAAP 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2009-069, 4 
431 200 Duty to adequately disclose the 
information in the financial 
statements 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2009-001, 8 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-119, 4 
435 501 Duty to determine if additional 
accounting segment information is 
needed 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-119, 4 
508 700 Duty not to express an unqualified 
audit opinion if the auditor has not 
performed the audit in accordance 
with PCAOB standards 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2009-001, 4 
543 600 Duty to assume responsibility for 
the work of another auditor or 
reference the audit of the other 
auditor and indicate the division of 
responsibility 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2005-138, 6 
550 560 Duty to determine whether the 
financial statements, the audit 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2009-005, 7 
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Table 3: Selected Duties Under 
PCAOB’s New Audit Standards 
GAAP became more principled in the 2009 creation of the ASC. As a 
consequence, accounting duties of care became easier to detect. 
Theoretically, accounting standards are part of auditing law because any 
departure from GAAP is a violation of GAAS.61 GAAS are the auditing 
standards used by the PCAOB and formally recognized by the SEC.62 Two 
sets of accounting standards are recognized by the SEC and AICPA. These 
standards are U.S. GAAP by the FASB and IFRS63 by the IASB.64 
                                                                                                                                          
 61. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 113 § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). 
 62. Pearson, supra note 5, at 109. 
 63. IFRS includes International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
 64. See supra note 33. 
report, or both require revision 
when a material inconsistency exists 
with the financial statements 
560 560 Duty to evaluate events after the 
balance sheet date, but prior to the 
issuance of the financial statements, 
which provide additional evidence 
about conditions that existed at the 
balance sheet date 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-006, 10 
561 560 Duty to consider the impact of 
subsequent events after the balance 
sheet date but before the date of the 
auditor’s report on the financial 
statements 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2009-001, 9 
 
Rule or 
standard 
Example of Auditors’ Duties 
Which if Breached Creates 
Negligence 
Examples of a Breach of Duty 
Rule 
4006 
Duty not to provide misleading 
documents
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-002, 4 
Rule 
5102 
Duty to cooperate with a 
PCAOB(or applicable regulatory 
agency) investigation 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-005, 2 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-004, 2 
AS No. 
1 
Duty to conduct the audit of a public 
company in accordance with 
PCAOB standards
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-006, 5 
AS No. 
3 
Duty to prepare audit 
documentation in sufficient detail to 
provide a clear understanding of its 
purpose, source, and the conclusions 
reached 
PCAOB Rel. No. 2005-138 
AS No. 
3 
Duty to indicate the date information 
was added, the author of such 
documentation, and the reason for 
adding it 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-002, 5 
AS No. 
5 
Duty to test management’s assertion 
of internal control 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-006 
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Table 4 extracts various duties of care from GAAP, recognizing that 
professional judgment under GAAP sometimes accepts a range of 
accounting treatments. These basic rules became more obvious with the 
revision of GAAP in 2009 into the FASB’s Accounting Standards 
Codification. Auditors help to ensure that client management follows the 
applicable accounting standards. 
Table 4: Selected Duties Under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
 
FASB ASC IASB 
IFRS 
Example of Auditors’ Duties to 
Recognize What GAAP Requires 
Examples of a Breach 
of Duty 
250-10-50-
1 
IAS 8 Duty to disclose nature of an 
accounting change and the reason 
for it 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2008-004, 8 
225-10-
S99-1(c) 
 Duty to evaluate an accounting 
conversion to/from U.S. GAAP 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2009-001, 7 
Glossary 
(capitalize) 
IAS 8 Duty not to capitalize an expense PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2008-004, 13 
820-10-30 IAS 8 Duty to evaluate whether the value 
of material property is properly 
assigned 
PCAOB Rel. No. 
2007-010 
350-20-35-
1 
350-30-35-
14 
 
IAS 38 Duty to test annually for impairment 
of an intangible asset which is not 
subject to amortization, such as 
goodwill 
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
2010-081, 5 
360-10-35 
 
IFRS 5 Duty to test long-lived assets for 
recoverability when events indicate 
possible non-recoverability 
 
605-15-25-
3 
 
 Duty to establish a reserve for 
estimated future returns  
if revenue is recognized at the time 
of shipment 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-001, 9-10 
310-10-30 
 
 Duty to test whether option rights 
would result in probable economic 
benefits for asset reporting 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2005-003, 4 
810-10-1 
 
IFRS 3 Duty to consolidate all majority-
owned subsidiaries 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2008-001, 8 
740-10-30 
 
IAS 12 Duty to determine deferred taxes 
separately for each tax-paying 
consolidated entity in each tax 
jurisdiction 
 
ASC > 900 IAS 41 Duty to apply industry specific 
guidance 
PCAOB Rel. No. 
2007-010 
230-10-45-
9 
IAS 7 Duty not to report non-cash activities 
in a statement of cash flows 
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-002, 6 
942-810-
S99-1 
 
 Duty to assess whether the risks and 
rewards of ownership were 
transferred in a nonperforming 
asset
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-
2007-001, 5 
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“Improper professional conduct” by accountants and auditors is 
classified by the SEC into two groups.65 The first class is “[a] single 
instance of highly unreasonable conduct.”66 The second class is “[r]epeated 
instances of unreasonable conduct.”67 These classes help the SEC analyze 
the appropriate sanction to impose. Litigators might use these classes to 
distinguish degrees of negligence. 
III. AUDIT INDUSTRY’S FAILED PURSUIT OF LEGAL 
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS 
High insurance costs,68 settlement costs,69 and litigation costs plague the 
auditing industry.70 Among securities class action lawsuit settlements, 
accounting-related settlements are significantly higher than non-accounting 
settlements.71 The number of securities class action lawsuits involving 
accounting has dropped to the lowest level post-SOX with them accounting 
for only 40% of the securities class action cases in 2008.72 Yet, the auditing 
profession has remained very concerned that even a few lawsuits could 
cripple a major accounting firm.73 
                                                                                                                                          
 65. SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Lack of access to adequate insurance coverage helped motivate the auditing profession to 
seek liability reform. Insurance coverage had decreased while premiums paid for coverage had 
increased, in part because the high loss ratio of claims incurred exceeding premiums received. For 
example, insurance premiums rose five-fold from 1984 to 1987 while the number of insurers 
dropped “from twelve in 1980 to three in 1986.” Gary Lawson & Walter Olson, Civil Justice 
Memo No. 16, Caveat Auditor: The Rise of Accountants’ Liability, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y 
RES. (May 1989), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_16.htm. 
 69. High settlement costs are shown in a table with the top fifty all time accounting 
malpractice settlements 1991–2008, based on audit analytics. See Mark L. Cheffers, Accounting 
Malpractice Scorecards, SN073 A.L.I.-A.B.A CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 369 (May 15, 2008). 
Some say “insurmountable pressure” exists for settlement, especially after class action 
certification. See John Gibeaut, An Outside Shot at Securities Fraud, A.B.A. J., June 2007, at 20. 
 70. See Thomas Lys & Ross L. Watts, Lawsuits Against Auditors, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 65 (1994). 
Selected portions of the audit industry are more likely to incur litigation. Lawsuits against auditors 
are more likely “when client firms are larger, experience financial difficulties and poor stock 
performance, and receive qualified audit reports. A lawsuit is also more likely if the auditor 
employs an unstructured audit technology and if the client represents a relatively larger proportion 
of the auditor’s revenues.” Id. at 65. 
 71. PWC 2008 STUDY, supra note 16, at 23. The accounting firm average settlement in 2008 
was approximately $51.7 million. Id. at 24. However, “[t]he highest nine [securities class action] 
settlements [in 2008] were exclusively accounting-related settlements.” Id. at 5. 
 72. Id. at 9. 
 73. See Steven Taub, Support for Limiting Auditor Liability, CFO.COM (Jan. 18, 2005), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3574746/c_3574770?f=home_todayinfinance. Commercial 
insurance could cover less than 5% of large claims against some audit firms. See LONDON ECON. 
& RALF EWERT, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY REGIMES: FINAL 
REPORT TO EC-DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES (MARKT/2005/24/F) xxxiii (2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf. 
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In 2005, caps on legal liability74 were sought by audit firms in the 
European Union (EU).75 Although some limited support existed for the 
proposal, the audit industry failed to obtain any protection against 
potentially large damages. Instead, liability protection varies among the EU 
member countries.76 With the expansion of securities lawsuits within the 
EU during the last five years,77 the problem of the lack of legal liability 
protection becomes more acute for the auditing profession. In 2008, a report 
from the European Commission provides some support for auditor liability 
caps, but again no action has been taken.78 
In the United States, audit firms have attempted to address the liability 
problem in various ways.79 In 2005, the Big Four audit firms included 
“punitive damage waivers in their client contracts.”80 The PCAOB found 
                                                                                                                                          
 74. James H. Irving, Jeff L. Payne, & Paul L. Walker, An Empirical Examination of the Impact 
of Liability Caps on the Auditing Market 14 (Working Paper Series, Feb. 15. 2010) (citing PUB. 
CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., EMERGING ISSUE—THE EFFECTS ON INDEPENDENCE OF 
INDEMNIFICATION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, AND OTHER LITIGATION-RELATED CLAUSES IN 
AUDIT ENGAGEMENT LETTERS (2006), http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/02092006_ 
SAGMeeting/Indemnification.pdf), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1490056. 
Liability provisions are found in engagement letters between clients and audit firms. . . . 
The PCAOB uses a . . . classification system of eight groups: indemnification, liability 
limited to fees, limitations based on time period of claim, limitations related to client’s 
right to assign or transfer the claim, exclusion of punitive damages, agreements on 
alternative dispute resolution, unsuccessful party to pay adversary’s legal fees, and 
auditor liability limited to client losses during the period. 
Id. 
 75. See ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A STUDY ON SYSTEMS OF CIVIL 
LIABILITY OF STATUTORY AUDITORS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SINGLE MARKET FOR AUDITING 
SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6 (2001), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditliability_en.pdf [hereinafter EU 
STUDY]; Letter from April Mackenzie, Exec. Dir. Pub. Policy, Grant Thornton Int’l, to DG 
Internal Mkt. & Servs, Unit 4F—Auditing Liab., European Comm’n, Consultation on Auditors’ 
Liability and its Impact on the European Capital Markets (March 15, 2007), 
https://www.gti.org/files/ec%20auditor%20liability%20grant%20thornton%20international%20fi
nal.pdf. 
 76. EU STUDY, supra 75, at 21–22. 
 77. See CAROL A.N. ZACHARIAS, ACE PROGRESS REPORT: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EXECUTIVE LIABILITY 17, 20 (2010), http://www.aceusa.com/Documents/Articles/ACE% 
20Progress%20Report-%20Int'l%20Exec%20Liability.pdf. 
 78. See Commission Recommendation 473/2008, Concerning the Limitation of the Civil 
Liability of Statutory Auditors and Audit Firms, 2008 O.J. (L 162) 39 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:162:0039:0040:EN:PDF. 
 79. Academics have also tried to address the liability problem. See, e.g., Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 711 (2007). 
 80. See Accounting Firms Seek Liability Protection, ACCOUNTINGWEB (Dec. 15, 2005, 
18:22), http://www.accountingweb.com/item/101579; Accountants Win Battle Over Liability, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2005, at 1. 
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such waiver limitations inappropriate, even when authorized by another 
country, such as the United Kingdom.81 
In 2007, the “Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession”82 to the 
Department of the Treasury had “extensive discussion regarding the impact 
of the . . . liability system on audit effectiveness and the . . . auditing 
profession.”83 “[C]aps on damages paid by auditing firms . . . strengthening 
[] bankruptcy defenses[, and] . . . government insurance for auditing firms,” 
were among the potential changes discussed by the Advisory Committee.84 
The accounting and auditing industries failed to make a persuasive case for 
any legal reform,85 even though audit liability limits were sought to help 
offset the “deep pocket” syndrome which increases their attractiveness as 
targets of legal complaints.86 Auditors have rarely had success in seeking 
statutory limits on their liability.87 
The damages sought against the CPA firms are sometimes huge.88 
About one-quarter of litigation cases now seek damages exceeding one 
billion dollars.89 However, since 1995, the six largest CPA firms have paid 
out less than six billion dollars to resolve 362 cases.90 Thus, on average, the 
firms have paid less than 5% of the damages historically sought against 
them. 
A failed attempt to limit their legal liability was made by the accounting 
and auditing profession in the United States through the Advisory 
Committee.91 However, the Advisory Committee did agree to recommend 
“a mechanism for the preservation and rehabilitation of troubled larger 
public company auditing firms.”92 The audit firms had lost their best 
political opportunity for legal liability limits during the early to mid 2000s 
                                                                                                                                          
 81. REPORT ON PCAOB, supra note 19, at 16. 
 82. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION: FINAL 
REPORT (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT]. 
 83. Id. at VII: 23. 
 84. Id. at VII: 28. 
 85. The six largest auditing firms who audit 99% of the U.S. public companies had revealed 
that they were defendants in ninety private actions related to audits of public and private 
companies. 
 86. EU STUDY, supra note 75, at 69–70. 
 87. Id. at 74–79. One of the few successes the auditing industry has had in limiting their 
liability was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See Sanford P. 
Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, SN073 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 167 (2008). The PSLRA 
established proportionate liability and made it more difficult to pursue class action lawsuits. See 
Irving, Payne & Walker, supra note 74, at 2. However, academic “studies suggest that the reduced 
[legal] exposure from the PSLRA may have led to less conservative auditing.” Id. at 8. 
 88. Seven of the ninety cases sought damages over $10 billion. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT 
REPORT, supra note 82, at VII: 25. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Various countries have discussed limiting auditors’ liability. See, e.g., Clinton Free, 
Limiting Auditors’ Liability, 11 BOND L. REV. 118 (1999). 
 92. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 82, at VIII: 9.  
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when Republicans controlled Congress under a Republican President. “[A] 
Democratic Congress is unlikely to carve out special exemptions for the 
accounting industry . . . .”93 
The judicial system simply enforces the requirements for accountants 
and auditors to exercise due professional care.94 Although auditing firms are 
not insurance companies covering financial losses, if professional 
negligence or fraud was conducted by the audit firm, responsible 
individuals and the audit firm should not receive special legal protection. 
IV. REFORMS NEEDED TO MINIMIZE LITIGATION AGAINST 
AUDITORS 
Failures in auditing and accounting continue to occur. In discussing the 
aftermath of SOX, the SEC noted that it continues “to discover both 
industry-wide and company specific failures of business ethics and of 
disclosures to shareholders. Such failures are, of course, offensive and 
unacceptable.”95 
Legal reform is needed to encourage corporations to cooperate with 
government investigations, particularly when the investigation concerns the 
accuracy of financial information provided to the SEC. “Various 
[worthwhile] prior proposals in Congress and the SEC deserve further 
consideration.”96 Although some financial reform legislation occurred in 
July 2010, the auditing profession may not welcome any increase in legal 
exposure. However, the profession should bear a greater risk of legal 
liability for audit failures when improper financial reporting is evident. 
Society should not tolerate the grossly negligent failures in auditing which 
                                                                                                                                          
 93. See Carrie Johnson, Accounting for the Future: Down to Four Big Firms and Fearing the 
Effects of Even One Major Suit, the Audit Industry Presses for Legal Relief, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 
2007, at D1. 
 94. According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002, it is an open question “[w]hether 
a GAAP violation makes a financial disclosure misleading per se.” See Peltz v. Polyphase Corp., 
No. 01-15732, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849, at *5 (9th Cir. June 5, 2002). Courts have noted that 
a showing of sub-standard accounting practices is circumstantial evidence that can support an 
inference of bad faith for a § 10(b) claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Sub-standard 
accounting practices should suggest that the representation in the financial statement was so 
flimsy that there was no genuine belief in the accounting position taken. 
 95. Donald T. Nicolaisen, Chief Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the 2004 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and 
PCAOB Developments (Dec. 6, 2004). 
 96. Pearson & Mark, supra note 18, at 115. The author has previously noted several potential 
reforms: 
In 2001, the House Judiciary Committee approved the “Financial Services Antifraud 
Network Act” to create a network linking financial fraud databases. . . . In 2003, 
Congress considered the “Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act.” 
This Act would have [several changes, such as] expand[ing] the maximum potential 
penalties for securities fraud, allow[ing] the SEC access to grand jury information, and 
increase[ing] the SEC’s subpoena powers. 
Id. 
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the PCAOB inspection reports revealed. This is a problem many courts 
have ignored in § 10(b)(5) securities litigation. The global capital markets 
need professional accounting and auditing work to maintain investor 
confidence in the integrity of the capital markets. 
Recent legislative changes from the Dodd-Frank financial reform 
legislation strengthened the PCAOB by expanding its jurisdiction to 
overseeing broker-dealers.97 However, further legislation is needed 
regarding the oversight of financial audits. Congress should prepare 
legislation that expands the PCAOB’s jurisdiction beyond the audit of 
public companies, and strengthens investors’ confidence in relying on audit 
opinions filed with the SEC.98 
An adverse judgment in a class action lawsuit based on negligence 
should cost a firm compensatory damages, but not excessive punitive 
damages which would jeopardize the firm’s ability to continue to exist. 
Government penalties present a better way to address systematically and 
more consistently excessive negligence, than exorbitant punitive damages 
in a court case. Although SOX has penalties to discourage wrongdoing,99 
the potential rewards of wrongdoing in accounting or auditing may 
sometimes still exceed the severity of legal penalties, if caught. 
The accounting profession should expect that more legal liability 
concerns in the courts may soon surface. Auditors will need to work with 
forensic auditors and lawyers more often to help limit potential legal 
exposure from letting the client maintain an improper accounting position, 
without the auditors noting the problem in the audit report. “Sustainability 
of the auditing profession ultimately [depends] upon the conduct of auditing 
firms themselves, their business model, governance, leadership, and 
especially their ‘tone at the top’—all of which are [extensively] linked to 
audit quality[,]” as noted by some members of the Advisory Committee.100 
More university education targeted at auditing, accounting, and relevant 
business areas is needed for the future audit professional to respond to 
likely future litigation.101 The need for an increased proportion of 
                                                                                                                                          
 97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
982, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 98. Currently, in most states third parties, such as investors, have no standing to rely on the 
audit opinion of a public company’s financial statements. 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4)–(5) (2006). 
 100. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 82, at VII: 29. 
 101. Often an auditor has just three hours of auditing and three hours of business law, despite 
the need for increased knowledge. See generally Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating 
Legally-Aware Accountants, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 597 (2001). Future auditors also need more 
accounting hours to learn how to research and analyze relevant professional standards and 
authorities. Research skills are especially essential as the volume of accounting and auditing 
professional standards and related legal requirements generally continues to increase. The 
educational problem begins with undergraduate accounting education that typically has not taught 
students how to research relevant professional authorities. More importantly, the education too 
often has not reinforced the necessary research mentality to find and apply the accurate 
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professional education at universities arises in part because of increased 
business complexities and the various professional standards that 
accountants and auditors of public companies must apply.102 A mandate by 
State Boards of Accountancy may be needed to encourage more educational 
institutions to respond to the professional needs of future accountants and 
help minimize future litigation against auditors.103 
The audit profession must adopt a commitment to quality by reducing 
audit failures and using increased conservatism in issuing unqualified audit 
opinions.104 A return to a technical skills—rather than client relation 
skills—emphasis is needed for future audit partners. Technical knowledge 
and research skills were often not emphasized at the local level of large 
firms. In the process, the profession lost part of its commitment to 
quality.105 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article advances transparent understanding of litigation against 
auditors for negligence. For the first time, fundamental duties under the 
auditing and accounting standards are articulated. The auditing profession 
cannot divorce itself from the law, as some would like to achieve. Instead, 
further intertwining of the auditing profession with the law is likely. By 
having failed both in the courts to abolish the PCAOB and in Congress to 
acquire more liability protection, extensive litigation against auditors for 
negligence appears likely to remain in the future. 
More second guessing of audits of clients’ financial statements in the 
legal environment is likely with the adoption by the FASB of more 
principled accounting standards. Given how the PCAOB inspection reports 
have revealed an unacceptable lack of quality in the audit profession’s 
work, it is likely that future reforms of the audit profession will further 
address improper audits of financial statements. If the audit profession is 
serious about stopping or even reversing this trend, the profession must take 
                                                                                                                                          
professional answer. Cf. THOMAS R. WEIRICH, THOMAS C. PEARSON, & NATALIE T. CHURYK, 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (7th ed. 2010) (attempting to 
correct the problem by developing the readers’ research skills). 
 102. A master’s degree is needed for future audit professionals in order for students to pursue 
real world accounting and auditing research, case courses, and additional knowledge in auditing 
and accounting. The proposed change would only slightly modify the existing rule for a total 150 
hours of university education. Future accountants also need more business knowledge and practice 
developing skills in information technology and finance to master complex accounting topics, for 
example those stemming from sophisticated financial products, such as derivatives. 
 103. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 116, 118. 
 104. The profession could also encourage members to seek a Malcolm Baldrige national quality 
award. See Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
http://www.nist.gov/baldrige/enter/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 105. The prior theory was that local partners skilled in client relations would always contact the 
national office experts for help when questions existed at the local level, despite some differences 
in economic motivations. 
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greater responsibility to meet the public’s expectations of quality audits of 
financial statements. 
Taking responsibility by the audit profession must include preparing 
higher quality future audit professionals. However, proposed changes face 
various obstacles that preserve the status quo. But if the profession does not 
take increased responsibility, more litigation against auditors is likely. 
